DC and RCB's Bowling Attacks

Roster construction under the microscope...

I’ve written a lot before about bowling attacks in the IPL, and how valuable it is for teams to have a bowling attack which offers above-average expected performance levels.

In fact, my research shows that having a strong bowling attack is basically mandatory if you want to assemble a squad which has high expectations of qualifications. Yet, you never hear commentators talking about this stuff on TV, and I’m continually surprised about the sheer number of players, coaches and decision makers who still haven’t completely grasped this concept.

Why is this the case? There are probably a mixture of factors. Firstly, the average fan probably overestimates the thought processes, analysis and strategy which most teams currently go into with both roster construction and team selection. Secondly, and for reasons that I don’t really understand, the impact of batters is often overvalued both from a performance perspective (high percentage of batters getting player of the match, for example) and also from a marketing perspective as well.

To prove my point, I want to show you some basic bowling data for qualifying and non-qualifying teams in the IPL over the last two seasons. Qualifying teams are highlighted.

You will see that (MI last season apart) the common denominator of qualifying teams is to fit into the boxed area towards the bottom left-hand corner - low economy rate in conjunction with low balls per wicket. The five teams closest to that bottom left-corner all qualified. These are obviously hallmarks of strong bowling teams.

Certainly, any team with a season economy rate below 8.70 runs per over conceded, and taking wickets on average every 19 balls or less has an excellent chance of qualification from the group stages.

So, with this knowledge (this is also a key driver of success in other leagues too) it’s clear to see that teams should invest in bowling as a priority. But often they don’t.

The opening matches of the IPL illustrate just as much. Having released Wanindu Hasaranga, RCB went into their match against CSK with Karn Sharma as their lead spinner backed up by Mayank Dagar and the match-up off-spin of Glenn Maxwell. Their pace attack hardly inspired confidence either.

RCB have often been considered a batting-strong team (and therefore, a bowling-weak team). It’s barely surprising when you consider that they currently spend 56 Cr (56% of their total budget) on five players, who are all either batters or batting all-rounders (Faf Du Plessis, Virat Kohli, Dinesh Karthik, Glenn Maxwell and Cameron Green).

In my view, worse than RCB’s bowling attack was DC’s against PBKS. The old famous quote about Corey Anderson and bowling at the death for RCB could be edited and reused here:

“If you have 100 Cr to build a cricket team, Mitch Marsh shouldn’t be a 4-over bowler”

I chatted to a few current players and coaches on WhatsApp both during and after this game. The general consensus was that the DC bowling attack was barely of Blast level in England. Opening the bowling was Ishant Sharma (who got injured), who can be an effective Powerplay operator at times, but is largely constrained to that phase. It’s also worth noting that in the mega auction in 2022, Ishant went unsold, and his recent sale prices have fluctuated between 50 lakh and 1.1 Cr - hardly premium prices.

Overall, their pacers went for 130-3 in 11.2 overs, while their spinners (both high quality) predictably were much more effective, costing just 45 in 8 overs, taking 2 wickets.

So, with the knowledge that DC have 100 Cr to build a cricket team, and that it’s obvious that a strong bowling attack is mandatory, how did they end up with a pace bowling attack of Ishant Sharma, Khaleel Ahmed, Mitch Marsh and Sumit Kumar, while playing 4 overseas batters?

It’s entirely reasonable to question the recruitment and roster management in this situation, as I tweeted yesterday.

A few people replied suggesting that they had to deal with injuries from their overseas pacers, but this isn’t a hugely mitigating factor when you consider the context of their overseas pace options.

Anrich Nortje - retained coming back from a long term injury

Jhye Richardson - has played just 16 matches in the last 3 seasons of the BBL and has had considerable injury issues

Lungi Ngidi - injured and out of the tournament. Replaced by a batter (Jake Fraser-McGurk)

Why DC replaced Ngidi with Fraser-McGurk as opposed to a replacement pace bowler is beyond me. Don’t get me wrong, Fraser-McGurk is a big talent and a player I expect to have a huge future, but to ignore the need for pace bowling reinforcement and then decide to play Shai Hope over Fraser McGurk is difficult to rationalise in any logical way. It would also be fair to suggest that the earlier recruitment decision made, releasing Phil Salt and bringing in Hope, was bizarre enough as well.

Recruitment decisions have a massive impact on a team’s chances of success, yet continually are approached in an illogical manner, often failing to adhere to obvious historical drivers of success. The opportunity for teams to use recruitment experts in order to gain a competitive advantage is evidently still there, and shows no sign of changing.

Anyone interested in discussing how I can help their team with strategic consultation and data-driven analysis, or contribute to any media work, can get in touch at sportsanalyticsadvantage@gmail.com.